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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACy-CONSENSUAL 
SODOMY AND THE CHOICE OF A MORAL DOCTRINE: NEW YORK'S 
PERMISSIVE POSITION-People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 
936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Onofre admitted to committing acts of deviate sexual 
intercourse in his home with a seventeen-year-old male. Onofre was 
convicted in the County Court of Onondaga County, New York, of 
violating the state's criminal statute prohibiting consensual sodomy.) 
The decision was reversed by the appellate division, and the indict­
ment against Onofre was dismissed on the grounds that the statute 
interfered with his constitutionally protected right of privacy and 
that it denied him equal protection of the law.2 The Onondaga 
County District Attorney appealed to the New York Court of Ap­
peals, where People v. Onofre3 was argued. 
This note examines the New York Court of Appeals decision in 
Onofre. Analysis focuses on the due process and equal protection 
arguments utilized by the court in its invalidation of the New York 
statute prohibiting consensual sodomy among unmarried adults in 
private, noncommercial settings.4 
1. "A person is guilty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975). Deviate 
sexual intercourse is defined as "sexual conduct between persons not married to each 
other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the 
mouth and the vulva." Id § 130.00(2) (McKinney 1975). 
2. People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), affd, 
51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 987 
(1981). 
3. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cerro denied, 451 U.S. 
987 (1981). 
4. This note deals with the right of privacy derived by the Supreme Court of the 
United States from the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth 
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 
N.Y.S.2d at 949. A right of privacy has been derived from other areas of the Constitu­
tion. U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX. A right of privacy has also been derived 
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Onofre is unique in a number of aspects. First, the case in­
volved unmarried heterosexual and unmarried homosexual defend­
ants. Thus, the opinion touched upon the fundamental right of 
privacy and the legislation of morality through issues which gener­
ally have been treated in separate discussions.s Next, the majority 
has illuminated a plausible interpretation of various Supreme Court 
decisions, ignored by some jurisdictions, which extends the funda­
mental right of privacy to private, consensual sexual acts between 
unmarried adults.6 Finally, the majority and dissenting opinions re­
flect the deep philosophical differences underlying arguments for 
and against the extension of a fundamental right of privacy and ar­
guments for and against judicial deference to legislative pronounce­
ment of morality in the area of consensual sodomy.7 
from the penumbras of these amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
485 (1965). 
5. Most criminal prosecutions involve only homosexual or heterosexual defendants 
rather than a combination of the two. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge ct.), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (state 
sodomy statute constitutional as applied to homosexual defendants); State v. Pilcher, 242 
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (state sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to acts of con­
sensual sodomy performed in private by adults of the opposite sex). 
Scholarly articles that analyze sodomy statutes in terms of homosexual and hetero­
sexual behavior do so in separate discussions and have not addressed or envisioned the 
situation in Onofre, where homosexual and heterosexual behavior were addressed within 
the same case. See, e.g., Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Life­
styles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977); Comment, The Constitutionality ofSodomy Stat­
utes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1976). 
The area of homosexual rights is vast. Discussion in this note focuses on the homo­
sexual's right to engage in private, consensual sodomitical acts without commercial as­
pects and without involvement of minors. (The statutory age of consent in New York is 
seventeen years). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3}(a} (McKinney 1975). It is not unreasona­
ble to assume that such sexual relations provide a foundation for homosexual relation­
ships and that extension of sexual freedom to the homosexual could be viewed as 
legitimizing the existence of homosexuals and their behavior. See infra text accompany­
ing notes 138-40. The concept of sexual privacy, however, is only one aspect of the law in 
the area of homosexuality. A court's invalidation of a consensual sodomy statute may 
well permit the homosexual to engage in acts of sodomy within the privacy of the home, 
yet such judicial action does not necessarily allow the homosexual to marry a member of 
the same sex, to teach in a public school, or to receive government benefits. See Karst, 
The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.l. 624, 628 (1980). Simply, there is a 
great deal more to human relationships than sexual activities. Invalidation or repeal of a 
consensual sodomy statute affects the sexual aspect of intimate homosexual and hetero­
sexual relationships. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the 
other aspects of intimate homosexual and heterosexual relationships, and the degree to 
which they are subject to government interference, see generally Karst, supra note 3. 
6. For a discussion of Supreme Court language lending itself to this interpretation, 
see infra text accompanying notes 36, 41-46. 
7. For a discussion of the moral values underlying the divergent majority and mi­
nority positions in Onofre, see infra text accompanying notes 104-41. 
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This case note examines each of these three areas and concludes 
that the Supreme Court of the United States must take a definitive 
stance on the issue of homosexuality before the law related to the 
rights of all unmarried individuals engaging in acts of private, con­
sensual sodomy can be settled. 
II. ONOFRE 
A. Facts 
Onofre was heard with two companion cases. Defendants 
Conde Peoples, III, and Philip Goss were convicted in Buffalo City 
Court of violating penal law section 130.38.8 A jury determined 
from the evidence that the two had engaged in an act of oral sodomy 
in an automobile parked on a street in the city of Buffalo during the 
early morning hours.9 This conviction was affirmed in the County 
Court of Erie County. The claim that the statute was unconstitu­
tional because it infringed on the right of privacy and was a denial of 
equal protection of the laws was rejected. lO 
Defendant Mary Sweat was convicted of the same crime after a 
jury trial in Buffalo City Court on proof that she had committed an 
act of oral sodomy with a male in a truck parked on a street in a 
residential area of the city during the early morning hours. I I Her 
appeal to the County Court of Erie County, based on a claim similar 
to that of defendants Peoples and Goss, was rejected. 12 
The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal 
in all three cases. 13 They were argued together in Onofre 14 and 
presented the common question of whether the provision of the New 
York Penal Code making consensual sodomy a crime infringed upon 
defendants' constitutionally protected rights. The court of appeals 
affirmed the reversal of Onofre's conviction and reversed the convic­
tions of defendants Peoples, Goss, and Sweat. ls The majority con­
8. 51 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
9. The fact that the act occurred in an automobile was of no legal consequence. 
See infra note 16. 
10. People v. Peoples & Goss, No. 483 (Erie County Ct., N.Y. Sept. 24, 1979), rev'd 
sub nom., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), 
cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
11. People v. Sweat, No. 3C12614 (Erie County Ct., N.Y. Sept. 24, 1979), rev'd sub 
nom., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cerro 
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
12. Id 
13. 49 N.Y.2d 895, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1980). 
14. 51 N.Y.2d at 483, 415 N.E.2d at 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
15. Id at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938,434 N.Y.S.2d at 948. 
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cluded that because the statute was broad enough to reach the 
noncommercial, secluded sexual conduct of consenting adults, it vio­
lated defendants' right of privacyl6 and right to equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the United States ConstitutionY 
The United States Supreme Court allowed Onofre to stand 
without comment. IS The Court denied a petition for writ of certio­
rari review on May 18, 1981.19 
B. Analysis 
1. Historical Origins of the Fundamental Right of Privacy 
The New York Court of Appeals held that section 130.38 of the 
New York Penal Code infringes on both homosexual and heterosex­
16. Id at 485,415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949. The New York Court of 
Appeals noted that both district attorneys claimed that the defendants' conduct drew the 
admitted acts of sodomy into the classification of public rather than private sodomy, 
which constituted a waiver of their right to assert a right of privacy. Id at 485 n.2, 415 
N.E.2d at 938-39 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949 n.2. The court explained, however, that be­
cause its disposition of the appeals also rested on the statute's violation of equal protec­
tion rights, it need not pass on the Erie County District Attorney's contention that 
because the acts of defendants occurred in vehicles parked on public streets, defendants 
were barred from claiming the activities to be private acts. Id 
The court also found the claim of the Onondaga County District Attorney that 
Onofre's participation in the taking of photographs while engaging in acts of sodomy and 
thereafter displaying such photographs to the district attorney rendered those acts public 
in character to be without merit. Id Onofre was not barred from asserting a right of 
privacy because the photographs were produced in response to specific criminal charges 
of sexual abuse and sodomy in the first degree, as opposed to the purposeful or careless 
display of such photographs to the public, as in Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. 
Va. 1973), affd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). 
51 N.Y.2d at 485 n.2, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39 n.2, 434 N.Y.2d at 949 n.2. 
The court of appeals' brief treatment of the location of the acts of sodomy by de­
fendants Peoples, Goss and Sweat reveals that the actual basis of the court's decision 
rests on equal protection analysis. This reduces the persuasiveness of the court's right of 
privacy analysis. Nevertheless, this note proceeds, as did the New York Court of Ap­
peals, on the assumption that the right of privacy analysis is applicable to the cases of all 
defendants. Bul if. Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853,855 (8th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied,423 
U.S. 929 (1975) ("The 'right of privacy' rationale stressed by appellant has not been ex­
tended by the Court to include the right to engage in the conduct for which appellant was 
convicted here, namely, sodomy in a car parked on a public highway"); Carter v. State, 
255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), eerl. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974) (act of sodomy at 
II p.m. in car parked on a well lit lot of a public rest and tourist information center 
adjacent to an interstate highway does not constitute private activity); Neville v. State, 
290 Md. 364, 378-79, 430 A.2d 570, 577 (1981) (sodomy statute applicable where each 
defendant engaged in consensual sodomy "during daylight hours in a place which. . . 
was equally accessible to uninvited other persons as it was to petitioner"). 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434 
N.Y.S.2d at 949. 
18. 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
19. Id 
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ual defendants' fundamental right of privacy.2o This perhaps is the 
most controversial and far-reaching aspect of Onofre .21 The origins 
of this right to privacy are found in Griswold v. Connecticut,22 in 
which the Supreme Court held that a Connecticut statute prohibiting 
all persons from using contraceptives was unconstitutional because it 
violated the fundamental right of privacy inherent in the marriage 
relationship.23 The Court stated that any statute intruding on the 
marital right of privacy would be strictly scrutinized and would be 
sustained only in the absence of alternative means of achieving a 
compelling state interest.24 
As a result of Griswold, many jurisdictions have ruled that crim­
inal sanctions cannot be imposed on married couples for sodomitical 
20. 51 N.Y.2d at 484-85, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49; see supra 
note 4. The existence of a fundamental right determines the court's standard of review 
under the due process and equal protection clauses. If a fundamental right is involved, 
strict scrutiny is utilized under both a due process and an equal protection review of the 
statute. It is said that "[w)hen an equal protection decision rests on this [fundamental 
right) basis, it may be little more than a substantive due process decision decked out in 
the trappings of equal protection." Note, The Conslilutionality ofLaws Forbidding Privale 
Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1624 (1974) (quoting Developmenls in the 
Law-Equal Prolection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1969»; see infra text accompany­
ing notes 107-08 for a discussion of substantive due process. Under due process analysis 
involving a fundamental right, a statute will be subject to strict scrutiny: it will be upheld 
only if it is a necessary means toward accomplishing a compelling state interest. Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Due process analysis is concerned with the relationship 
between the means and ends of the statute while under equal protection analysis, atten­
tion focuses on whether the statute disadvantages one group in comparison to another. 
Developments in the Law-Equal Proleclion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1969). In 
adding the fundamental interest theory to equal protection analysis, "a classification 
might be found to be invalid even though it is not invidious and even though it is reason­
ably related to a legitimate public purpose." Id. Under equal protection fundamental 
right analysis, a court will weigh the benefit of the state's interest against the harm result­
ing from the impairment of the personal interest. Id. "If the state's objective is not 
important enough to justify impairment of the individual's interest, the classification will 
fall. Here the focus is on the injustice created by unwarranted state interference with a 
fundamental interest at least as strongly as on the injustice engendered by inequality." 
Id. It should be noted that the Onofre court did not address the "suspect classification" 
aspect of equal protection analysis, which involves scrutiny similar to fundamental rights 
analysis. See infra note 85. 
Fundamental rights for due process purposes include at least those rights that are 
fundamental for equal protection purposes. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (due 
process case citing equal protection cases holding that the right of privacy is fundamen­
tal). If there is no fundamental right involved, then the due process and equal protection 
analyses are separate inquiries at lesser levels of judicial scrutiny. 
21. The Onofre majority actually decided the case on equal protection grounds. 
See supra note 16. 
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
23. Id. at 485-86. 
24. Id. at 504. 
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sexual conduct.25 The current trend of case law indicates that anti­
sodomy legislation no longer is applicable to married couples, re­
gardless of whether the wording of the state statute has been changed 
to accord with Griswold.26 
Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has attempted to specify 
other areas of personal decisions in which the individual may choose 
a course of action without unjustified government interference, while 
also noting that "the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not 
been marked by the Court ...."27 The areas specified by the 
Supreme Court as within the sphere of protected private conduct are 
personal decisions relating to marriage,28 procreation,29 contracep­
tion,30 family relationships,3l childrearing and education,32 and 
abortion.33 
It is out of these delineated areas that the debate surfaces as to 
whether the right of personal privacy extends to all sexual activities 
between consenting adults, or whether the protected areas symbolize 
a narrower right of privacy that allows freedom to make personal 
decisions concerning the bearing of children.34 The divergent view­
25. Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 382 n.17, 430 A.2d 570, 579 n.17 (1981) (holding 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1982) constitutional as applied to defendants), cites nu­
merous cases that have held or strongly implied that the general prohibition of a per­
verted practices or oral sodomy statute cannot be applied to consenting married persons 
acting with each other in private based on the constitutional right of privacy. See Cotner 
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875-76 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Doe v. Com­
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (E.D. Va. 1975), affdmem., 425 U.S. 901 
(1976); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620,625 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th 
Cir.) (en bane), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 
1980). 
26. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 847 
(1968); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) 
(en bane), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F .. Supp. 729 
(N.D. Tex. 1970), vacaled and remanded sub nom., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 
(1971); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969). 
27. Carey v. Population Services Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977). 
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967). 
29. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). 
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
32. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
34. The debate surfaces in recent cases. See Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th 
Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting),cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981) (commission of homos ex­
ual act is not an impermissible ground for selective service prosecution under Article 125 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976»; Beller v. Middendorf, 
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80, cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 855 
(1981) (upholding constitutionality of Navy regulation providing for the discharge of 
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points can be traced to language in Eisenstadt v. Baird.35 Eisenstadt 
eliminated the distinction between married and unmarried couples 
in the area of contraception. This holding has been interpreted as 
extending the right of privacy to all sexual activities.36 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered 
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an in­
dependent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa­
tion of two individuals. . .. If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child.37 
A less expansive view of this language is that the right referred to in 
Eisenstadt is simply the freedom to make decisions related to the 
birth of a child.38 Roe v. Wade 39 substantiated this narrow view. Roe 
held that the right of privacy is a liberty guaranteed by the four­
teenth amendment concept of personal liberty, thus entitling an un­
married woman to terminate her pregnancy. 40 
The Onofre majority adopted the more expansive interpretation 
of the language in Eisenstadt.41 The New York Court of Appeals 
construed the Supreme Court decision in Roe as an extension of the 
Eisenstadt definition ofprivacy.42 In combining the reasoning of the 
those engaging in homosexual practices); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 
(1981) (Maryland perverted practices statutes MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1982) con­
stitutional as applied to defendants); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 
434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 
(R.I. 1980) (right of privacy inapplicable to private, unnatural copulation between un­
married adults). 
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court in Eisensladl held that because "the distribu­
tion of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on their distribu­
tion to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible." Id at 453. 
36. See, e.g., Miller v. Rumsfield, 647 F.2d 80, 85 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting), 
cerl. denied; 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 
1973), offd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Neville v. 
State, 290 Md. 364, 390, 430 A.2d 570, 583 (1981) (Davidson, J., dissenting); People v. 
Onofre, 51 N. Y .2d at 487, 415 N .E.2d at 940, 434 N. Y.S.2d at 950; see also Wilkinson & 
White, supra note 5 at 589. 
37. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
38. E.g., Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 374, 430 A.2d 570, 575 (1981); People v. 
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 498,415 A.2d at 946,434 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting); 
State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 1980); see also Comment, supra note 5, at 574. 
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
40. Id at 153. For another narrow construction of Roe, see State v. Santos, 413 
A.2d 58, 68 (R.1. 1980). 
41. 51 N.Y.2d at 488,415 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951. 
42. Id at 486-87, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950. 
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two cases, Onofre defined privacy as the freedom to make choices 
about one's intimate affairs.43 Justice Gabrielli's dissent in Onofre 
acknowledged the fundamental right ofprivacy.44 In the spirit of the 
Eisenstadt language,45 however, he contended that only marital inti­
macy and procreative choice fall under such protection.46 
2. Due Process 
The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court47 limits the effect 
of the court's decision to the State of New York,48 where the funda­
mental right of privacy has been extended to an unmarried adult's 
43. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 590. Yet the Court in Roe did not summa­
rily equate privacy with autonomy: "[lIt is not clear to us that the claim. . . that one has 
an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the 
right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions." 410 U.S. at 154. 
44. 51 N.Y.2d at 499, 415 N.E.2d at 946, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Gabrielli, J., 
dissenting). 
45. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
46. 51 N.Y.2d at 499, 415 N.E.2d at 947, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Gabrielli, J., 
dissenting). 
47. 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
The sole significance of such a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari need not 
be elucidated to those versed in the Court's procedures. It simply means that 
fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision 
of the lower court as a matter of sound judicial discretion. . . . 
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912,917 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting 
the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (citation omitted). 
48. The privacy discussion in Onofre serves as mandatory authority only in the 
State of New York, although Onofre has been noted in other jurisdictions. See Miller v. 
Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 84 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting) (adopting the majority view 
in Onofre that private consensual homosexual activity is protected as an aspect of the 
fundamental right of privacy), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf, 
632 F.2d 788, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting the Onofre decision yet upholding the consti­
tutionality of a Navy regulation providing for the discharge of those engaging in homo­
sexual practices), reh'g en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cerro denied, 454 U.S. 855 
(1981). 
Neville V. State, 290 Md. 364,430 A.2d 570 (1981), is particularly interesting as it 
appears to be directly contrary to Onofre. The Neville majority held that where each 
petitioner had engaged in intimate sexual activities during the daylight hours in a se­
cluded place that was as accessible to uninvited persons as it was to petitioners, the 
Maryland perverted practices statute was constitutionally applied. Id. at 381, 430 A.2d at 
578. The majority found that MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1982), was not subject to an 
equal protection attack as married persons as well as unmarried persons could be prose­
cuted under the statute. Id. at 382, 430 A.2d at 579. The Neville dissent, however, 
adopted the view of the Onofre majority and found that the acts of petitioners were 
entitled to the constitutionally protected fundamental right of privacy. Id. at 391, 430 
A.2d at 584 (Davidson, J., dissenting). Further, in a fashion similar to that of the Onofre 
majority, the Neville dissent also found that the state does not have a compelling interest 
in regulating private, consensual sexual activity among adults. Id. at 396, 430 A.2d at 
586 (Davidson, J., dissenting). 
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personal decisions related to sexual activity within the seclusion of 
the home.49 Onofre is significant in that the majority revived an ex­
pansive view of the right of privacy that was ignored by the majority 
of a three-judge district court and by the Supreme Court's summary 
affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.5o 
. Doe involved Virginia's sodomy statute.51 In Doe, a group of 
male homosexuals sued in federal district court for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. They argued that Virginia's sodomy statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to consensual homosexual acts per­
formed in private by adult males.52 The Doe majority concluded 
that state legislation regulating personal conduct was constitutionally 
suspect only when it "trespass[ed] upon the privacy of the incidents 
of marriage, upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of 
family life."53 The majority quoted 54 dicta in a dissent from Poe v. 
Ullman ,55 wherein Justice Harlan argued that private homosexuality 
could be criminally prosecuted.56 Doe acknowledged the right of 
sexual privacy only in the area of decisions related to home, mar­
riage, and family: a view consistent with the traditional view of Gris­
wold and the narrow interpretation of Eisenstadt.57 Doe serves as a 
reminder that although a right to private sexual activity may exist, 
49. See supra note 20 for a discussion on the scope of due process analysis. Despite 
the fact that the New York Court of Appeals found that under due process section 130.38 
violated constitutionally protected fundamental rights, the court's brief treatment of the 
settings of defendants' acts of sodomy evidenced the court's intent to rest its holding on 
equal protection grounds. See supra note 16, infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text. 
50. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge ct.), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 
(1976). Onofre involved both homosexual and heterosexual behavior. Many federal 
courts have understood the holding in Doe to be that homosexual conduct does not enjoy 
special constitutional protection under the due process clause. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 
F.2d 788, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted), rehg en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 S. Ct. 855 (1981). 
51. VA. CODE § 18.2-36 (1982). The statute states in part: 
CRIMES AGAINST NATURE-If any person shall carnally know in any manner 
any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or 
by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she 
shall be guilty of a . . . felony. . . . 
Id 
52. 403 F. Supp. at 1200. 
53. Id 
54. Id at 1201-02. 
55. 367 U.S. 497, 546, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
56. Id More recently, however, at least one Justice has indicated that the constitu­
tionally protected right to privacy may include private, consensual, sexual activities. "I 
have serious doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an interest in regulat­
ing any sexual act between consenting adults." California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 
n.1O (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26, 38-40. 
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this right must be balanced against "countervailing state interests."58 
The Doe majority did not acknowledge the possible extension of the 
fundamental right of privacy, evident in Eisenstadt and Roe,59 which 
supports the freedom of the individual to make decisions about inti­
mate personal matters. 
The extension of the fundamental right of privacy, ignored by 
Doe, was further evidenced in Stanley v. Georgia .60 Stanley is an 
important factor in Onqfre because it expanded6J the scope of the 
fundamental right of privacy beyond notions of the family related or 
childbearing areas enumerated in Roe.62 Stanley established the 
home as a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, meaning one 
was permitted to view sexual materials defined as obscene by the 
community. This decision, in tum, allowed the Onqfre majority to 
find that acts of sexual gratification within the home were constitu­
tionally protected and that the consensual sodomy statute63 violated 
defendants' fundamental right of privacy.64 
58. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 599. This proposition is supported by the 
Onofre dissent. 51 N.Y.2d at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J., 
dissenting). 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 43. 
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding the right of an adult to possess and to view 
obscene materials in the privacy of the home). 
The Onofre dissent read Stanley to suggest that petitioner was protected only be­
cause he exercised a constitutional right to receive information and ideas. 51 N.Y.2d at 
501 n.2, 415 N.E.2d at 948 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59 n.2 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). 
This view is also the majority view in Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 374-75, 430 A.2d 570, 
575 (1981). See supra note 48. 
Yet the Onofre majority's emphasis on the special nature of the home suggested that 
it was at least as much the setting as the nature of the activity that prompted the protec­
tion. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 586 n.119. This view prevailed in Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), in which the Supreme Court stated that "the 
'privacy of the home' . . . was hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his 
castle.''' Id at 66 (interpreting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564). 
Thus, Stanley can be interpreted to stand for the proposition that the constitution­
ally protected right to privacy includes intimacies occurring in private that are associated 
with personal relationships. Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 390, 430 A.2d 570, 584 (1981) 
(Davidson, J., dissenting). This view is in accord with the Onofre majority. But see 
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 1980) (listing of federal cases holding 
that homosexual activities are not constitutionally protected), reh'g en bane denied, 647 
F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981). 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 43. 
62. 410 U.S. at 153. 
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975). 
64. This apparently assumes that there is, indeed, a fundamental right of privacy 
that stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend­
ment. Inherent in the Onofre majority's discussion of the right of privacy is the assump­
tion that Supreme Court cases, including Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, are proper 
interpretations of the "open-ended" due process and equal protection clauses of the four­
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At least one authority believes that the majority m Doe "as­
teenth amendment. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181 (1980) (acknowledging 
that constitutional provisions are "open-ended"). But if., Bergcr, Ely's "Theory ofJudi­
cial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87, 120-21 (1981) (Berger claims that "[i]t is ... sheer 
fantasy to maintain that the founders employed 'open-ended' terms in order to empower 
judges to overrule the legislature or rewrite the Constitution by invoking values derived 
outside the Constitution"). Id at 121. The Onofre dissent also assumes that the funda­
mental right of privacy exists, although in a more limited sense. See supra notes 37-40 
and accompanying text. 
This case note deals specifically with the choice between the Onofre majority and 
dissenting theories regarding the right of privacy. This debate is also revealed in the 
contrast between the Onofre and Doe majorities. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that other constitutional questions concerning the fourteenth amendment's fundamental 
right of privacy exist. One question inquires as to the nature ofjudicial adjudication; the 
second question asks, assuming that the fundamental right of privacy is the business of 
the courts, whether such a right be properly interpreted from the Constitution. 
Debate on the first question centers on whether Supreme Court cases prior to 
Onofre, proclaiming that a fundamental right of privacy can be derived from the four­
teenth amendment, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 481; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. at 443; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164, are examples of proper judicial 
adjudication.. What constitutes proper adjudication, however, varies according to the 
particular doctrine of constitutional theory that is utilized. See generally Symposium: Ju­
dicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). 
American constitutional theory has been marked by an ongoing effort to 
reconcile two fundamental propositions about constitutional law, legislation, 
and the judiciary in American society. The first proposition ... the justifica­
tion principle, asserts that there are occasions when judicial displacement of 
legislative decisions-judicial review-is justified. The second proposition is 
that judges cannot justifiably do whatever they want, but must respect some 
constraints on their behavior as judges ... the restraint principle. Constitu­
tional theory attempts to specify the constraints that judges must respect by 
deriving them from the Constitution and the nature of democracy. It seeks to 
constrain judges both directly, by the moral force it exerts on their work, and 
indirectly, by providing an agreed-upon standard against which their work can 
be measured. 
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge ofTown: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitu­
tional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1037 (1980). 
Tushnet's article is a critique of Ely's, Democracy and Distrust, which proposes that 
judicial review under the Constitution's open-ended provisions be restricted to questions 
of participation as opposed to questions dealing with the substantive merits of the polit­
ical choice under attack. J. ELY, supra, at 181. This representation-reinforcing theory of 
judicial review is an example of what Tushnet refers to as the restraint principle. 
Tushnet,supra, at 1037. The popular characterization of the representation theory by the 
Supreme Court was written by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ofProcess-Based Constitutional 
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1980). For another major representation-reinforcing 
theory, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980) 
(Supreme Court should not review federalism disputes between the states and the na­
tional government; nor should it review separation of power disputes between Congress 
and the executive branch). 
Although the Choper and Ely theories differ, both share the common ground that 
constitutional theory "should focus on function and process, in particular, on the broad 
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concern whether nonjudicial institutions fairly represent diverse interests and, in those 
cases in which they do not, on the special role of judicial review in securing that repre­
sentation." Richards, Moral Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in Consti­
tutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 319 (1981). Proponents of this theory would, as a 
result, find that the right of privacy derived by the Supreme Court from the fourteenth 
amendment is improper judicial adjudication, as the Court must avoid "controversial 
judgments about substantive issues left open by the Constitution's text and history, and 
[instead safeguard) the representative character of the political process." Tribe, supra, at 
1063. 
Tribe, however, in the spirit of Tushnet's justification principle, see Tushnet, supra 
at 1037, contends that the representation-reinforcing theory of Ely "by itself determines 
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented by a 
full theory ofsubstantive rights and values-the very sort of theory the process-perfecters 
are at such pains to avoid." Tribe, supra, at 1064. Paul Brest is of a similar opinion and 
questions Ely's proposition in Democracy and Distrust "that courts are more competent 
to engage in representation-reinforcing judicial review, ... than in fundamental values, 
which he [Ely) scorns." Brest, The Substance ofProcess, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 131 (1981) 
(emphasis in original). Brest believes that "instances of representation-reinforcing de­
mand value judgments not different in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort." 
Id 
While Tribe and Brest embrace a theory of judicial adjudication that seems to em­
brace substantive rights and values similar to the right of privacy that has evolved from 
the fourteenth amendment and is now at issue in Onofre, a question remains as to the 
proper interpretation of those substantive rights and values from the Constitution. As­
suming that the theory of judicial adjudication includes substantive values, the issue is 
simply how the Constitution should be interpreted. The opposing theories are "interpre­
tivism" and "noninterpretivism," each reflecting, respectively, the "longstanding debate 
that pervades all oflaw, that between 'positivism' and 'natural law.' " J. ELY, supra, at I. 
Ely sees noninterpretivism as the view "that judges deciding constitutional issues should 
confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written 
Constitution." Id Interpretivism is seen as "the contrary view that courts should go 
beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the 
four comers of the document." Id 
Paul Brest, although agreeing that the terms represent basically the same concept, 
describes the contending theories as "originalism" (which can be divided into the subcat­
egories "strict originalism" and "moderate originalism") and "nonoriginalism." Brest, 
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204-05 
(1980). Professor Brest explains the reasons for his differing terminology: 
Virtually all modes of constitutional decisionmaking, including those endorsed 
by Professor Ely, require interpretation. The differences lie in what is being 
interpreted, and I use the term 'originalism' to describe the interpretation of text 
and original history as distinguished, for example, from the interpretation of 
precedents and social values. 
Id at 204 n.!. According to originalism, then, it is possible to adopt a theory of judicial 
adjudication that embraces substantive rights and values which at the same time dis­
avows existence of a fundamental right of privacy derived from the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT 
By JUDICIARY 166-220 (1977). Berger contends that 
[t)he Court, it is safe to say, has flouted the will of the framers and substituted 
an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original design [of the fourteenth 
amendment): to leave suffrage, segregation, and other matters to State govern­
ance. It has done this under [the) cover of the so-called 'majestic generalities' of 
the Amendment-'due process' and 'equal protection'-which it found 'conve­
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sumed away" an important, emerging constitutional question.65 
This question is whether, after Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stanley, there 
exists a fundamental right to engage in private sexual practices 
outside of the traditional marital and childbearing context.66 The 
Onofre majority addressed this question and answered it affirma­
tively.67 The court of appeals, relying on Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stan­
ley, adopted a trend in Supreme Court opinions protecting an 
individual's right to make decisions concerning indulgence in private 
acts of sexual intimacy and an individual's right to satisfy sexual 
niently vague,' without taking into account the limited aims those terms were 
meant to express. 
Id at 408. This view is to be contrasted with that of a nonoriginalist, David A.J. Rich­
ards, who argues that an examination of moral and philosophical theory can clarify the 
fourteenth amendment's right of privacy. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional 
Right 0/Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1282-87 (1977). 
In sum, the questions related to constitutional theory, i.e., the role of the judiciary in 
adjudicating constitutional issues and the nature of constitutional interpretation, reveal 
that the conflict between the majority and dissent in Onofre is only one aspect of the 
multi-faceted debate related to the fundamental right of privacy. The preceding discus­
sion reveals that there is not only a controversy as to which view of the right is correct, 
exemplified by the debate in Onofre, but also a debate as to whether such a right exists, 
and if it does, a debate as to whether the courts are the appropriate forum for the applica­
tion or rejection of the fundamental right of privacy. 
65. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 592. 
66. Id 
67. 51 N.Y.2d at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The precedential 
significance of the summary affirmance of Doe by the Supreme Court is limited, inas­
much as the Court gave no reasoning to explain exactly what it was affirming. "It is not 
at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to give full consideration to a question 
that has been the subject of previous summary action." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes, 
439 U.S. 463, 477 n.20 (1979». It should be noted that the lower court's decision does not 
necessarily represent the reasoning of the Supreme Court. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 
U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975). 
The Onofre dissent viewed the Doe affirmance as maintaining the state's right to 
intervene in decisions involving pure sexual gratification. 51 N.Y.2d at 503, 415 N.E.2d 
at 949, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The Onofre majority, however, 
suggested that the disposition of the district court in Doe included no statement regard­
ing the constitutionality of the statute and merely denied the relief requested and dis­
missed the complaint. Id at 493,415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954. 
[I]n Doe there was lacking any evidence of threatened prosecution . . . 
under the Virginia statute-a factor arguably relevant to their standing to main­
tain the action. . . . Thus, the affirmance by the Supreme Court of the District 
Court's dismissal of the action may have been predicated on a lack of standing 
on the part of the plaintiffs. 
Id (citation omitted). This argument has not been accepted by jurisdictions that have 
relied on Doe. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Hence, Doe establishes "the 
proposition that state efforts to prohibit private, consensual homosexual conduct are con­
stitutionally permissible, despite Stanley v. Georgia, Eisenstadt, and Roe." Wilkinson & ". 
White, supra note 5, at 593. 
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desires through the use of material condemned as obscene by com­
mon standards.68 The court of appeals labeled these rights "funda­
mental";69 such a conclusion necessarily dictated that the statute be 
upheld only if it was the sole means available to accomplish a com­
pelling state purpose.70 
In subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny, a new debate arises. 
Assuming that the right to indulge in acts of private, consensual sod­
omy is encompassed by a constitutionally protected fundamental 
right, the state must assert a compelling interest in prohibiting con­
sensual sodomy between unmarried consenting adults in noncom­
mercial settings, absent elements of force and involvement of 
minors. Yet the Onofre majority found that the state was unable to 
provide even a rational basis to justify its regulation of consensual 
sodomy.71 The prosecution did not present any evidence that section 
130.38 prevented physical harm to unmarried adults who engaged in 
private, consensual acts of sodomy,72 or that any such harm was en­
visioned by the state legislature when the state's penal law was 
adopted.73 The majority further contended that there was no show­
ing by the state that interference in matters of intimate sexual behav­
ior out of the public view would serve to advance the cause of public 
morality.74 Nor did the prosecution reveal that section 130.38 pro­
68. 51 N.Y.2d at 487-88, 41c5 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950-51. The court of 
appeals expressed no view as to any theological, moral, or psychological evaluation of 
consensual sodomy, nor was it unaware of the sensibilities of those who believe that 
consensual sodomy is evil and should be unpunished. The court, however, saw the issue 
in Onofre as whether the federal Constitution permits recourse to sanctions of criminal 
law for the achievement of that objective. Id at 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434 
N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3. 
69. 51 N.Y.2d at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950. 
70. Id; see Roe, 410 U.S. 113. This is another way of stating that the court must 
use strict scrutiny in its review of the statute. See supra note 20. 
71. 51 N.Y.2d at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951. Under its equal 
protection analysis, the court noted that infringement upon defendants' fundamental 
right of privacy would require that the statutory classification be necessary to the accom­
plishment of a compelling state interest. Id at 492 n.6, 415 N.E.2d at 942 n.6, 434 
N.Y.S.2d at 953 n.6. The court went on to state, however, that because the statute failed 
to satisfy the lenient rational basis standard, there existed no need to measure the statute 
by the strict scrutiny standard. 
The court's inability to find a rational basis for the statute under equal protection 
analysis suggests that the aforementioned logic is applicable to the due process portion of 
the Onofre opinion. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. There is an argument, 
however, that in refusing to defer to the legislative judgment under due process analysis, 
the court actually was utilizing a form of heightened scrutiny. See infra text accompany­
ing notes 93-104. 
72. Id at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. 
73. Id at 489,415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951. 
74. Id at 489-90,415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52. 
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tected the institution of marriage, inasmuch as it was not suggested 
that sodomy served as a substitute for marriage; or that empirical 
data existed to indicate that marriage served as a refuge for those 
deprived of the option of consensual sodomy outside of the marital 
bond.75 The court distinguished Onofre from another court of ap­
peals case, People v. Shepard.76 In Shepard, the court of appeals 
held constitutional a statutory proscription of the use of marihuana 
in the home where there was found to be a legitimate controversy, 
over credible evidence, as to whether marihuana could be considered 
a dangerous substance.77 This finding justified the state legislature's 
right to conclude that marihuana was a dangerous substance and, 
accordingly, to impose a criminal proscription.78 In Onofre, how­
ever, the majority concluded that there was no evidence that the 
practice of consensual sodomy was harmful either to the participants 
or to society in general and found that the only argument made 
against the statute was an appeal to the historical, conventional char­
acterization of sodomy.79 
The Onofre majority, utilizing due process analysis, found that 
the right of an adult to engage in private, consensual acts of sodomy 
was encompassed by the constitutionally protected fundamental 
right of privacy. The court reasoned that simply because it would be 
constitutionally permissible for the legislature to enter the privacy of 
a person's home to regulate conduct arguably harmful to that per­
son, the legislature was not entitled to invade this privacy in an effort 
to regulate individual conduct where there was no evidence that the 
75. Id at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. 
76. 50 N.Y.2d 640, 409 N.E.2d 840,431 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1980). 
77. Defendant Shepard was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled sub­
stance in the seventh degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 1980). Defendant 
was in possession of nine marihuana plants. 50 N.Y.2d at 643, 409 N.E.2d at 841, 431 
N.Y.S.2d at 364. These plants contained an aggregate weight ofless than nine-tenths of 
one ounce of marihuana. Id at 649, 409 N.E.2d at 845, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Fuchsberg, 
J., dissenting). This concentrated form of marihuana, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(5) 
(McKinney 1980), was not encompassed by the Marihuana Reform Act of 1977. 1977 
N.Y. Laws, ch. 360 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.00-.55 (McKinney 1980»; but 
see 50 N.Y.2d at 649, 409 N.E.2d at 845, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). 
78. 50 N.Y.2d at 649, 409 N.E.2d at 845,431 N.Y.S.2d at 368. 
79. 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53. 
[I)t is apparent that western civilization has through the centuries abhored tric) 
sodomy, fellatio and cunnilingus. See Genesis 19:1-29; Deuteronomy 23:17, 
Leviticus 18:22-23,20:16. As early as 1533 in the reign of Henry VIII, England 
enacted statutes prohibiting sodomy which became a part of American common 
law at the time of the American revolution. 
State v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1,4,540 P.2d 732, 735 (1975), rev'd in part, affd in part, 
113 Ariz. 107,547 P.2d 6 (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976) (citations omitted). 
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activity is harmfu1.80 The statute could not be justified as a valid 
exercise of police power authorized for the preservation of morality, 
as "[n]o substantial prospect of harm from consensual sodomy nor 
any threat to public-as opposed to private-morality has been 
shown."81 This view reflects a minority view of jurisdictions in the 
United States.82 
3. Equal Protection 
The New York Court of Appeals also invalidated section 130.38 
on the ground that it denied defendants equal protection83 of the 
law.84 Section 130.38 discriminates on its face against unmarried 
persons because it prohibits them from engaging in an activity which 
results in no sanctions against married persons. As a result of this 
unequal treatment, the court looked to whether, at a minimum, there 
was "some ground of difference that rationally explain[ed] the differ­
ent treatment accorded married and unmarried persons ..." under 
80. 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N'y.S.2d at 953. 
81. Id at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
82. Private, consensual sodomy is a criminal offense in a majority of states: ALA. 
CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1977) (married couples excluded); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13­
1411, 13-1412 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977) (homosexual acts only); D.C. 
CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3502 (West 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-2002 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); !UN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 
(1981) (homosexual acts only); Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 34-35 (West 1970); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, 
750.338, 750.338(a)-(b) (1968) (homosexual, lesbian and heterosexual acts); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 609.293 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1981) (homosexual acts 
only); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1979) (homosexual acts only); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14­
177 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 886 (West 1958); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 
(1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) (homosexual acts only); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 944.17 (West 1982). 
The following states have decriminalized consensual sodomy: Alaska; California; 
Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Maine; Nebraska; 
New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; Oregon; South Dakota; 
Vermont; Washington; Wyoming. People V. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 476, 415 N.E.2d 
936, 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (1980), urt. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), held N.Y. PE­
NAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975) unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 
Pa. 91,93-94,415 A.2d 47, 48-49 (1980), held 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon 
1973) unconstitutional as violative of equal protection of the law. See infra note 134. 
83. The equal protection attack was not made in Doe V. Commonwealth's Attorney, 
hence, the equal protection attack on consensual sodomy statutes has yet to be ruled on 
by the Supreme Court. See, Comment, supra note 5, at 586. 
84. 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
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the statute.85 
It was upon equal protection analysis that the court of appeals 
rested its holding. Although the court decided that the state demon­
strated no compelling interest sufficient to justify the infringement of 
a fundamental right under due process, it left this holding open to 
question and invalidated the statute through equal protection argu­
ments in a manner similar to the Supreme Court's holding in 
Eisensladl.86 
If we are correct in the view earlier expressed in this opinion that 
section 130.38 of the Penal Law infringes on defendants' right of 
privacy which is a fundamental right, then, as observed in Eisen­
stadt, the statutory classification "would have to be not merely 
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the . 
achievement of a compelling state interest" .... As was so in Ei­
senstadt, however, we do not need to measure the statute by that 
test inasmuch as it fails to satisfy even the more lenient rational 
basis standard.87 
The court of appeals found that there was no evidence showing 
that the classification created by section 130.38 achieved state goals 
or was related to any articulated state justification. Section 130.38 
did not protect the institution of marriage or rights accorded married 
persons.88 The statute was not shown to preserve or foster mar­
riage.89 No evidence was advanced to reveal that consensual sod­
omy relates to rights accorded married persons.90 As a result, the 
court concluded that there was no rational basis for permitting mar­
ried persons to engage in sodomitical behavior while forbidding un­
married persons to do the same.91 This conclusion echoed an earlier 
rationale that "all [of] the arguments that have ever pertained to the 
prohibition of 'deviate' forms of intercourse. . . have pertained irre­
85. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 447. The Court of Appeals did not address the 
"suspect classification" aspect of eq ual protection analysis. If the classification were sus­
pect, then strict judicial scrutiny is required and the state must show that the legislation is 
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Analysis in this area is similar to the 
scrutiny used in cases involving a fundamental right. See supra note 19. For a discussion 
of homosexuals and their qualifications as a suspect class, see Note, supra note 20, at 
1624-27. But see DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(homosexuals are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class). 
86. 405 U.S. at 438 (1972). 
87. 51 N.Y.2d at 492 n.6, 415 N.E.2d at 942 n.6, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953 n.6 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis in original). 
88. Id. at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
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spective of the marital status of the participants."92 
The Onofre majority stated that it utilized minimum scrutiny to 
examine the explanation for the different treatment accorded mar­
ried and unmarried persons.93 The court of appeals, however, actu­
ally used a form of heightened scrutiny in its analysis of section 
130.38. True minimum scrutiny would mean that the court automat­
ically should defer to a judgment of the legislature, as did the 
Supreme Court in applying the minimum scrutiny standard of re­
view to economic and social regulations.94 Yet the court an~logized 
its rationale to that used by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt and was 
unwilling to defer to the legislative judgment.9s 
Eisenstadt indicated that the Supreme Court would be hesitant 
to increase the number of fundamental rights and suspect classes in 
the area of personal liberties and, hence, the Court utilized an inter­
mediate level of scrutiny in an effort to look closely at the reasona­
bleness of the connection between the classification and the purpose 
of the statute.96 
92. People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 891, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (Buffalo City 
Ct. 1974) (there is no logical or factual reason for permitting the marital status ofpartici­
pants to determine whether the mode of sexual conduct is legal or criminal), vacated, 97 
Misc. 2d 905, 412 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Erie County Ct. 1975). 
93. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
94. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 
U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,. 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Lincoln Fed­
eral Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. 
Nebraska ex rel W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
95. The justification for deference under minimum scrutiny analysis is the court's 
unwillingness to substitute its own judgments for those of the legislature. Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 520-21 (Black, 
J., dissenting); Carpenters & Joiners Union Loca1213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 728 
(1942). 
96. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. 
REV. I, 20-48 (1972). 
A student note contends that while Gunther's model, which includes an alternative 
to the traditional two tiers of the equal protection test, may offer greater protection for 
private consensual sodomy, later Supreme Court cases do not support the intermediate 
scrutiny model, most notably Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). Note, 
supra note 20, at 1627 n.108. 
More recent cases suggest, however, that Gunther's model has taken a firm hold in 
the Ninth Circuit, which has interpreted recent Supreme Court decisions as favoring the 
utilization of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Hatheway v. Secretary of 
Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf, 
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,454 
U.S. 855 (1981). 
Recent decisions indicate that substantive due process scrutiny of a government 
regulation involves a case-by-case balancing of the nature of the individual in­
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As in Eisenstadt, the Onofre majority refused simply to defer to 
the legislative judgment. Unlike Eisenstadt, however, the Onofre 
majority found it unnecessary to hypothesize a rational state pur­
pose,97 as one already existed: the upholding of public morality.98 
The court of appeals held: 
[The prosecution] failed to demonstrate how government interfer­
ence with the practice of personal choice in matters of intimate 
sexual behavior out of view of the public and no commercial com­
ponent will serve to advance the cause of public morality or do 
anything other than restrict individual conduct and impose a con­
cept of private morality chosen by the State.99 
Thus, even if it were assumed that the objectives tendered by the 
prosecution100 were matters of legitimate public concern, no rational 
relationship was evidenced between upholding public morality and 
terest allegedly infringed, the importance of the government interests furthered, 
the degree of infringement, and the sensitivity of the government entity respon­
sible for the regulation to more carefully tailored alternative means of achieving 
its goals. 
Id at 807 (citation omitted). Cases supporting this balancing test, also known as inter­
mediate scrutiny, are Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concur­
ring) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring»; 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
The dissent in Miller v. Rumsfeld strenuously argued against such an interpretation 
of these cases, as it contended that the court attempted to justify its utilization of the 
intermediate scrutiny approach in an effort to avoid a discussion of petitioner's funda­
mental right of privacy and thus, hold against petitioner under a lesser standard of scru­
tiny. Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 80-83 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting), cerro 
denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981). 
This is contrasted with the situation in Onofre, where the majority, in refusing to 
defer to the legislative goal of upholding public morality, balanced the state's interest 
with the interest of the individual and as a result, used intermediate scrutiny to find for 
respondents. 
97. The Supreme Court in Eisenstadt determined for itself the legislative purposes 
and then concluded that the statutory means were not related to the legislative purposes. 
The three possible purposes of the statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives 
were deterrence of premarital sex, protection of community health through regulation of 
harmful articles, and limitation of the use of contraceptives. 405 U.S. at 442-43. The 
Court found these purposes either marginally or completely unrelated to the distinction 
between married and unmarried persons. Id at 445-49. 
98. That the enactment of section 130.38 of the Penal Law was prompted by 
something other than fear for the physical safety of participants in consensual 
sodomy is suggested by ... the chaIrman of the Temporary Commission [on 
Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code]: 'It would appear that the Leg­
islature's decision to restore the consensual sodomy offense was, as with adul­
tery, based largely upon the premises that deletion thereof might ostensibly be 
construed as legislatIve approval of deviate conduct.' 
51 N.Y.2d at 489,415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 (citation omitted). 
99. Id at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91. 
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the classifications created by section 130.38. As a result, the statute 
fell as it violated the right of equal protection purportedly enjoyed 
by persons who are unmarried. lol An argument can be made that if 
the court of appeals were to have used a true minimum scrutiny 
standard of review,102 the statute prohibiting unmarried individuals' 
private, consensual sodomitical activities should have been up­
held. lo3 Such an argument can be made as there is at least slight 
merit to the legislature's contention that proscription of consensual 
sodomy among unmarried adults will help to uphold public moral­
ity.l04 At this point, the question becomes whether the regulation of 
morality is a matter for legitimate legislative concern. 
III. QUESTIONS OF MORALITY 
Regardless of the type of analysis, be it due process or equal 
protection, and regardless of the level of scrutiny, be it strict, inter­
mediate, or minimum, the Onofre majority believed that unmarried, 
consenting adults in private settings should not be subject to criminal 
sanctions for acts of sodomy. lOS The ultimate question posed by 
Onofre is whether a state may regulate consensual sodomy purely 
for the purpose of safeguarding the moral interest of its citizens and 
to what extent a legislature or court may choose and enforce a moral 
viewpoint. 106 
Justice Gabrielli argued in Onofre that the majority's reasoning 
was similar to the discredited doctrine of substantive economic due 
process. 107 His dissent claimed that the majority used its own no­
tions of justice to override a penal statute enacted by the legislature 
as an expression of society'S view as to what constitutes morally ac­
101. 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 942-43, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
102. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
103. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, c.J., dissenting) 
("[t)here is a right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society ...."); 
Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 384, 430 A.2d 570, 580 (1981) (one valid objective of a 
perverted practices or sodomy statute is the protection of public morality). 
104. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
105. The Court of Appeals expressed no view, however, as to any theological, 
moral, or psychological evaluation of consensual sodomy, nor was it unaware of the sen­
sibilities of those who believe that consensual sodomy is evil and should be prohibited. 
51 N.Y.2d at 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3. 
106. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interstate commerce power may be 
used to defeat purposes that are deemed to be immoral. E.g., United States v. Orito, 413 
U.S. 139 (1973) (transportation of obscene material for private use). See also, Comment, 
supra note 5, at 580. 
107. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
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ceptable behavior. 108 Therefore, the controversial issue that re­
mained was the nature of morally acceptable behavior. Although 
Justice Gabrielli accused the Onofre majority of implementing its 
own notions of morality, his traditional view of morality,109 also 
based on an interpretation of Supreme Court decisions, is open to 
the same attack. I 10 The Supreme Court, in determinations of funda­
mental rights and suspect classes, has drawn the criticism that it en­
gages in substantive due process analysis. lll .Doe v. Commonwealth's 
Attorney 112 represents this criticism. l13 
We cannot know whether the Court believed no privacy right ex­
isted at all, or whether one existed but was far outweighed by 
some government interest. But we can certainly wonder what dis­
tinguishes a heterosexual's privacy interest in marriage, procrea­
tion, contraception, abortion, and child-rearing-all protected by 
the Constitution-from a homosexual's privacy interest in having 
sexual relations. I 14 
Perhaps all that we know about .Doe is that it symbolizes judicial 
recognition of government regulation of private, consensual sexual 
conduct,ll5 a view purported by the Onofre dissent. While Justice 
Gabrielli contended that this view is of greater intrinsic merit than 
the majority's notions of morality, he did not articulate why the .Doe 
view is of greater validity than the view of the Onofre majority. 
One critic of .Doe contends that the Supreme Court "may have 
summarily limited the right of privacy in a way that suggests fiat, not 
articulated principle."116 This fiat, the view that homosexual con­
duct is not constitutionally protected, is justified by proponents who 
reason that condemnation of certain sexual practices can be traced to 
portions of the Bible. 117 Yet portions of the Bible indicating that 
108. 51 N.Y.2d at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J., 
dissenting). 
109. See supra notes 37-40; infra notes 124-26. 
110. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 615 (1977) (citing Ely, The 
Wages o[ Crying Wort A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973». 
111. Baze\on,supra note 110, at 616. 
112. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge Ct.), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 
(1967). 
113. Bazelon, supra note 110, at 616. 
114. Id 
115. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 599. 
116. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right o[ Privacy: A Moral 
Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1977). Richards' article discusses whether the 
Supreme Court's view is fundamentally consistent with the moral theory underlying the 
right to privacy. Id at 1286- 1321. See supra note 64. 
117. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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homosexual practices must be equated with lack of good moral char­
acter, "like many other parts of the Holy Book, require interpreta­
tion and ... even eminent theologians have not construed them as 
condemning all homosexuality." 118 
The dissent in Onofre maintained the view, however, that 
sodomitical practices between consenting unmarried adults could be 
proscribed and that the state could regulate moral behavior. Justice 
Gabrielli accused the majority of extending Stanley to represent the 
proposition that one is entitled to do anything in one's home as long 
as it does not result in harm or jeopardize the well-being of others. I 19 
The dissent reasoned that the holding in Shepard l20 should be dis­
positive of the issue in Onofre: "I cannot agree ... that the right of 
an individual to select his own form of sexual gratification should 
stand on any better footing than does the right of an individual to 
choose his own brand of intoxicant without governmental inter­
ference."121 
The divergence of opinions in Onofre reflected the debate of 
Lord Devlinl22 and H.L.A. Hart l23 that stemmed from the Wolfenden 
Report .124 Devlin believed that society has a general right to substi­
tute its moral judgment for that of the individual, even at the ex­
pense of personal liberty. 125 Devlin opposed the Wolfenden Report, 
urging that "the suppression of vice is the law's business because a 
violation 9f the society's moral structure undermines the very basis 
118. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (petition for naturaliza­
tion granted to homosexual). 
119. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 586. Gabrielli acknowledged that the 
legislature may not exercise power in a manner that would impair a fundamental right, 
yet he argued that "it begs the question to suggest, as the majority has, that such a right is 
necessarily involved whenever the State seeks to regulate conduct pursuant only to its 
interest in the moral well-being of its citizenry." 51 N.Y.2d at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 
N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). 
120. 50 N.Y.2d at 640,409 N.E.2d at 840, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 363. See supra notes 76­
77 and accompanying text. 
121. 51 N.Y.2d at 497-98, 415 N.E.2d at 946, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J., 
dissenting). 
122. See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). 
123. See generally H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963). 
124. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 
THE WOLFENDEN REPORT (1963). The report proposed the decriminalization of homo­
sexuality, as the function of criminal law "is to preserve public order and decency." THE 
WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra, at 23. The report maintained that "there must remain a 
realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's 
business. To say this is not to condone or encourage private immorality." Id at 48. 
125. See Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement ofMorals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 
987 (1966). . 
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of that society."126 Hart, in contrast, supported the Wolfenden Re­
port, finding it "difficult to understand the assertion that conformity 
... is a value worth pu:rsuing ..."127 and he "accepted the regula­
tion of private conduct only so far as necessary to prevent harm to 
others." 128 
The Onofre majority, like Hart, advocated personal autonomy, 
while the dissent, in the spirit of Devlin, held that society's view of 
morality is the view with which the individual must abide. 129 Doe 
also revealed this split in philosophical thought. Although the Doe 
majority found that homosexual behavior was not constitutionally 
protected, the dissent argued that every individual has the right to be 
free from unwarranted government intrusion into one's decisions re­
lated to private matters of intimate concern. 130 A number of recent 
cases also reflect this debate. 131 Although they" vary in their fact pat­
terns,132 each case addressed the question of whether an individual 
has a fundamental right of privacy with respect to private, consen­
sual acts of sodomy. 133 The debate spurred by Devlin and Hart con­
tinues, perhaps best reflected by the contrast between Onofre and 
Doe. 
Delineation and illumination of the differing viewpoints, how­
ever, does not resolve the question of which viewpoint is correct; nor 
does it provide an answer to the question of how such a viewpoint 
might be applied. 134 
126. Note, GONZ. L. REV. 575, 576 (1977). See P. DEVLIN, supra note 122, at 25. 
127. H.L.A. HART, supra note 123, at 57. 
128. Note, supra note 126, at 577. 
129. Post Griswold cases cause one to speculate as to whether the courts' refusal to 
extend constitutional privacy protection to nonmarried persons really stems from percep­
tions of rational basis or compelling state interests, or whether the refusal actually stems 
from perceptions of moral propriety. Eichbaum, Lovisi v. Slayton: Constitutional Privacy 
and Sexual Expression, 10 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 525, 533 (1978-79). 
130. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting). 
131. Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting), eert. denied, 
454 U.S. 855 (1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. de­
nied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g en 
bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Neville v. State, 290 
Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 (1981); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980). 
132. See supra notes 34, 48 for an explanation of the respective fact patterns. 
133. Id 
134. The Onofre majority, willing to extend a fundamental right to private consen­
sual acts of sodomy, and unwilling to defer to a legislative goal of upholding the public 
morality, claimed that it was "not plowing new grounds" in the area. 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 
415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. To support this contention, the court cited State 
v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (no compelling state interest sufficient to justify 
intrusion by an Iowa statute prohibiting acts of sodomy between consenting, unmarried 
adults of the opposite sex); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (fornica­
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Were the Court actually to undertake the task of judging the ra­
tionality of sodomy legislation, selecting standards could prove 
most difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it may be doubted that a 
purely ethical justification-where no harm to the safety or mental 
well-being of the actors or others is involved--<:an be demon­
strated by the logic and proof inherent in reasonableness and 
rationality. 135 
This quotation concludes with an example of frustrating logic: "The 
impossibility of showing that sodomy legislation safeguards morality 
would be ground enough for holding it irrational and void. On the 
other hand, if the moral harm produced by acts of sodomy cannot be 
demonstrated, neither can it be proved that sodomitical conduct 
causes no such harm."136 Such logic also reveals the futility of an 
attempt to resolve the philosophical conflict in Onofre. 
Wilkinson and White,137 however, suggest that a tangible com­
pelling state interest exists to justify state regulation of purely moral 
interests, one not raised in Onofre: the state's interest in the prohibi­
tion of homosexuality. 138 They contend that the state has a legiti­
mate interest in discouraging public behavior that gives widespread 
offense, and that homosexual behavior as well as heterosexual be­
havior involves public conduct. 139 Their concession to the argument 
that the public would adjust to displays of homosexual behavior 
leads them to another compelling state justification: "The most 
threatening aspect of homosexuality is its potential to become a via­
ble alternative to heterosexual intimacy."I40 
Yet even if the assumption were made that the state's interest in 
the prohibition of homosexual behavior was compelling and that 
consensual sodomy statutes were a necessary means of discouraging 
such behavior, the issue of whether consensual sodomy could be pro­
tion statute ruled unconstitutional as it regulates private morality; such conduct cannot 
be inhibited through criminal sanctions); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 
A.2d 47 (1980) (oral sodomy statute struck down on equal protection grounds as it ex­
cluded on its face persons married to each other). 
135. Comment, supra note 5, at 584. 
136. Id. at 585. 
137. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5. 
138. Id. at 593. The term "unmarried adult" necessarily includes unmarried ho­
mosexual adults. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 595. BUI see In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which 
the court reasoned that the public's complacency with regard to private homosexual con­
duct, reflected in sparing enforcement of laws proscribing homosexual activity, is justifi­
cation enough to hold that the law does not specifically extend to consensual sodomy in 
private. Id. at 928-29. 
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scribed between heterosexuals on purely moral justifications would 
remain. 141 Without attempting to supply an answer to this question, 
the New York Court of Appeals has held that private, consensual 
acts of sodomy between unmarried adults is a fundamental right 
protected by the Constitution and that a statute excluding married 
persons from the prohibition violates the fourteenth amendment 
guarantee of equal protection under the law. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari review to Onofre does 
little to clarify the extent to which unmarried adults may engage in 
private, sodomitical consensual sexual acts. The New York Court of 
Appeals has relied on a broad interpretation of Griswold and its 
progeny,142 which cannot be reconciled with the narrow view of the 
fundamental right of privacy related to marriage and childbearing 
that may be discerned from the same cases. The court of appeals has 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has the power of final dispo­
sition of the matter. 143 Until the Supreme Court acts on this aspect 
of the fundamental right of privacy, the court of appeals' decision in 
Onofre can be viewed as a sound decision which rests on equal pro­
tection analysis similar to that utilized by the Supreme Court in 
Eisenstadt .144 
Eisenstadt, and its elimination of the distinction between mar­
ried and unmarried persons, if understood to extend sexual freedom 
in private to consenting adults,145 necessarily extended this freedom 
to private homosexual acts. Onofre adopted the more expansive 
view of Eisenstadt and reflected society'S changing attitudes toward 
sexual conduct. 146 Onofre also exemplified the philosophy advo­
cated by H.L.A. Hart which supports freedom of the individual. 
Doe, however, was in accord with the narrow interpretation of 
141. Some authority indicates that heterosexual deviate sexual conduct would be 
acceptable. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), qffd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th 
Cir.) (en banc), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 
1976); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 377, 430 A.2d 570, 576 (1981) (dictum), State v. 
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 214, 381 A.2d 333, 339-40 (1977). But see, State v. Callaway, 25 
Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev'd sub nom., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,547 
P.2d 6 (1976) (en banc), em. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976); State v. Elliot, 89 N.M. 305, 551 
P.2d 1352 (1976). 
142. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
143. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
144. 405 U.S. at 438. 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 41-43. 
146. Potter, Sex Offenses, 28 ME. L. REV. 65, 90 (1976). 
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Eisenstadt which would allow a right of personal privacy in sexual 
activities related to the birth of children. 147 This suggests that the 
state has an interest in regulating private sexual behavior, especially 
in cases involving homosexual behavior. Doe, contrary to Onofre, 
reflected the philosophical view supported by Lord Devlin, which 
holds that the individual must sacrifice some liberty for the overall 
good of society. 
Onofre and Doe represent two opposing theories on the applica­
tion of moral doctrine. 148 Although the opposing philosophies ap­
pear valid when examined separately, their existence has created a 
dichotomy in case law which cannot be settled until the issue of ho­
mosexuality is resolved. The compromise suggested by the concur­
ring opinion in Onofre, 149 that moral judgments can be made by the 
legislature so long as they are applied fairly,ISO is the most equitable 
solution. The concurring opinion of Judge Jasen contended that a 
moral judgment must app~y equally to all citizens. 151 This means 
that in the area of consensual sodomy a choice between moral doc­
trines would allow a legislature to adopt either: The view advocated 
by Devlin, the Onofre dissent, and the Doe majority, which holds 
that for the good of society all adults sacrifice their privilege to en­
gage in private, consensual sodomy; or the view of moral doctrine 
supported by Hart, the Onofre majority, and the Doe dissent, which 
favors the freedom of the individual, specifically the right of an adult 
to engage in private, consensual sodomy. Unfortunately, a simple 
resolution of the opposing philosophies is prevented by the issue of 
homosexuality. Homosexuality prevents the exclusive adoption of 
either of these views. While Griswold extended the right of privacy 
to the marital bedroom and Eisenstadt extended this right to unmar­
ried persons, Doe suggested that the homosexual segment of the pop­
ulation sacrifice its individual liberty for the moral good of society. 
The ultimate choice becomes whether a particular moral view is 
applied to all unmarried persons, or simply to a certain segment­
the homosexual population. The broader issue is whether married 
persons can be treated differently from unmarried persons with re­
147. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting). 
148. Compare the Doe majority, 403 F. Supp. at 1199 and the Onofre dissent, 51 
N.Y.2d at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 944,434 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting), with the 
Onofre majority, id. at 476, 415 N.E.2d at 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 947 and the Doe dissent, 
403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting). 
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spect to decisions pertaining to sodomitical acts. If sodomy were, in 
fact, deviate or harmful, then a fair application of moral doctrine 
would require that sodomy be proscribed for all citizens. If sodomy 
were not found to be harmful to participants, that is, adults in pri­
vate settings, then fair application of a moral doctrine would require 
that all citizens be allowed to engage in consensual sodomy. Eisen­
stadt stands for the proposition that married and unmarried persons 
cannot be treated differently in terms of access to contrac,eptives. 152 
The issue, and major point of contention in this note, is whether such 
equal treatment is applicable to areas of sodomitical activity unre­
lated to the birth of a child. The Onofre court extends this equal 
treatment to intimate sodomitical behavior among consenting adults 
in private settings and will leave the discouragement of homosexual 
behavior to social institutions other than the New York Penal Code. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the Supreme Court to clarify this area of the law, it must 
decide between the two underlying philosophiesl53 embodied in 
Onofre and Doe. The choice exists in both due process and equal 
protection analysis, under either strict or minimum scrutiny. In a 
due process analysis applying strict scrutiny, extension of a funda­
mental right of privacy to secluded acts of consensual sodomy be­
tween unmarried adults necessarily includes approval of private, 
consensual homosexual acts.154 Restriction of the fundamental right 
of privacy, however, infringes upon the right of unmarried adults to 
engage in intimate personal decisions related to private sexual activi­
ties. The Court's choice under equal protection analysis with strict 
scrutiny is similar. The finding that unmarried persons are deprived 
of a fundamental right entitles adult members of that group to in­
dulge in private acts of consensual sodomy and necessarily includes 
approval of private, consensual homosexual acts. Should it be found 
that the classification does not interfere with a fundamental right, 
however, the right of an unmarried adult to engage in intimate per­
sonal decisions related to private sexual activities is severely 
curtailed. 
Under minimum scrutiny, the options also are mutually exclu­
sive. Using this level of scrutiny, a court will decide whether, under 
152. 405 U.S, at 438. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 116-29. 
154. The term "unmarried" necessarily encompasses all homosexuals in the 
United States, as our government does not sanction homosexual marriages. 
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due process, it will defer to a legislative decree of the means by 
which it attempts to achieve morally acceptable behavior. Under 
equal protection, a court will decide whether to defer to a legislative 
classification which may only slightly further a state's goal of up­
holding a high standard of public morals. In deferring to the legisla­
ture, the court restricts the rights of unmarried, consenting adults to 
engage in specified forms of sexual gratification. Yet in finding no 
rational connection between state purposes and means or classifica­
tions employed, that is, not deferring, the court allows homosexual 
as well as heterosexual, consensual, private sexual acts. In allowing 
these acts, the court may not be applying a minimum scrutiny test. 
The Court's options under both strict and minimum scrutiny il­
lustrate the fallacy of the concurring opinion in Onofre, which rea­
sons that morality may be enforced by the legislature, through the 
courts, so long as the legislative judgment is applied fairly and 
equally.155 The Supreme Court, in ultimately choosing one option 
over the other, must adopt a particular moral point of view. 156 Yet 
the choice of a particular view in the area of private, consensual sex­
ual activities among adults necessarily excludes the other point of 
view and necessarily infringes upon those whose beliefs and lifes­
tyles do not conform to the Court's chosen morality. For a moral 
judgment to be applied fairly, the Court either must allow all indi­
viduals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy or it must declare 
that such acts are proscribed for all persons. The former view in­
cludes acceptance of homosexual behavior, while the latter view 
would rescind a right already given to some members of society. 
The Court, however, must consider cautiously its role in this 
regard, for in invalidating a consensual sodomy statute on equal pro­
tection grounds, it leaves a state legislature with little choice but to 
draft a statute punishing all consensual sodomy or to allow such be­
havior to go unpunished. The compromise, punishment of only con­
sensual, private homosexual acts as in Doe, is not a fair application 
of a moral judgment to all citizens. 
Douglas Everett Schwartz 
155. 51 N.Y.2d at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 944, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954 (Jasen, J., 
concurring). 
156. See supra notes 106-39 and a~mpanying text. 
